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Peairs: The West Virginia Public Service Commission: IV. Rate Regulation
THE WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC SERVICE CO?=IISSION*

C. A. Pum,
IV.

JR.**

RATE REGLATION.

1. General Principles. Rate regulation is perhaps the most
important single item of governmental control of public utilities.
Serious disputes arise in connection with the enforcement of public
utility duties to serve all, to render adequate service, and to serve
without discrimination; utilities often contest the power of governing authorities to regulate their accounts, corporate structures,
and other business affairs; but none of those matters touches so
nearly as rate control the vital spot of the enterprise. The power
to regulate rates strikes directly at the pocketbooks of those engaged in the enterprise, and an improper exercise of that power
violates the canons of due process more clearly than in the case of
any of the other powers so far discussed. A great portion of the
litigation is on the subject of procedure ana judicial review; but
those matters are not quite so close to the life line, analytically, as
this. The existence of the power of the state or its agencies must
be established before the manner of exercise can become important.
The limits and descriptions of the power are of primary concern;
the method of its exercise may be found only later, and may depend
to a degree on its nature
The quantity of litigation in the field of rate regulation has
earned a great deal of legal publicity, and within the last fifty or
sixty years there has grown up a sort of common law on the subject. There are few West Virginia cases on the subject worthy of
detailed comment, but there are many leading cases in other jurisdictions which are undoubtedly worth careful consideration in a
study of the West Virginia law on the subject. Many of them are
leading cases in other divisions of the law applicable to this commission and their discussion here may to a degree supplement that
of West Virginia cases, to which previous chapters have been
almost exclusively confined. 62
* The first and second installments of this article appeared in (1940) 46 W.
VA. L. Q. 201 and 292; the third installment appeared in (1941) 47 W. VA.

L. Q. 192.

** Member of the Mlonongalia County bar; mow instructor in law, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts.
162 The rate cases of foreign jurisdictions discussed here have been largely
taken from the materials collected in BARNES, CASES ON PUBLIC Utrirv
REGULA.TI N (1938) 264-663, and ROBINsON, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITIES (1935)
319-502. It was not felt necessary to make a more exhaustive search than in
the materials referred to in these sources, cfor a general survey such as is contained here. This survey is intended not as an authoritative treatise on the
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The first inquiry in this topic must be as to the source of the
lcgislative power to regulate rates. While this is by no means clear
on a basis of pure logic and public utility law as of 1880, it is well
settled by authority. The case of Munn v. Illinois,16 8 involving legislative regulation of grain elevators, is the leading case on the subject. Added to by the holdings of the Railroad Commission Cases'0 '
and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. v. Minnesota,'" the rule
was fairly well settled by 1900 and by 1930 -yas thoroughly imbedded in the law, so that today the existence of this legislative
power is taken for granted. By this time legislatures had advanced
to new fields in their exercise of this power, such as the establishment of minimum rates, and such extraordinary measures had even
been upheld by the Supreme Court."6" The study of such legislation does not, however, yet belong to this field of the law.
As for the regulatory commissions, by 1930 their opinions
rarely left anything to be desired, and often compared favorably
with those of the appellate courts of their jurisdictions. Some of
these opinions are noteworthy technical documents, reflecting the
calibre and training of their membership.
The objective of commission regulation of rates is not only to
protect consumers from unreasonably high rates, but also-equally
important-to prevent price discrimination between consumers.
Various factors enter into a determination of a "reasonable" rate
under this dual definition: the value of the service to consumers,
the volume of utility earnings, general economic conditions, those
prevailing in the particular region, the character 'and adequacy of
the service rendered, and the history of the particular company,
all have some bearing on the question, and have been considered to
varying degrees in the cases.
Assuming for argument that the Nebbia case is sui generis and
not a binding authority in public utility cases generally (although
it probably is, under present trends), the problem of minimum
rates may be dealt with quite apart from that of maximum rates.
The reason behind a maximum rate order is generally to prevent
a utility which has a monopoly from taking advantage of it by
charging exorbitantly, while that behind a minimum rate order is
materials throughout the country in this field,-but rather as background for
the West Virginia materials, and to fill gaps in West Virginia law, whoro
there are no local decisions, and where general law will probably be followed.
263 94 U. S. 113, 25 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
164 Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. Ed. 636 (1886).
165 134 U. S. 418, 10 S. Ct. 462, 33 L. Ed. 970 (1890).
166 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
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probably usually to prevent competing utilities from staging a
price war which will affect the service rendered by either of them.
The question of commission power to set minimum rates was raised
in Public Service Comm. v. Great Northern Utilities Co.,' 6 7 involving specific rate orders as to natural gas. There it appeared
that the market was not big enough to support both utilities, and
that the company protesting would not be able under the order to
earn a reasonable return, due to the competition. A unanimous
court held the order proper, saying that the order must be shown
to be confiscatory, causing the loss of property, to upset it. It
seems an unfair result to subject a company to competition and
to prevent it from competing, and it seems also that the reason
advanced for the result, that the commission was acting in the interests of the public, to prevent rates so low as to cause service
standards to decline, is not a valid one, because the conditions of
competition existing were calculated to cause such a decline anyway. However, such considerations are probably insufficient to
raise serious constitutional issues, and the decision of the court is
proper as to the result reached.
An example of the method of treating an individual rate order
is seen in Northern Pacific R. R. v. North Dakota.168 There the
rate set failed to cover the total costs attributable to the particular
traffic for which the rate was set. The state court held that in
crder to show confiscation it must appear that a net loss was
suffered on all rates, or that a fair return on the carrier's property
was not earned, due to the rate. The Supreme Court, in reversing,
said (per Mr. Justice Hughes) : ". . . . it could not be said that the
carrier may be required to charge excessive rates to some in order
that others might be served at a rate unreasonably low.' 69 This
idea of robbing Peter to pay Paul was the only possible alternative
to a generally confiscatory rate, and was advanced under some
notion of fostering local industries. The local policy, however,
proved insufficient to combat the constitutional objection. The result seems eminently fair: certainly if the state wished to subsidize an industry it should do it in a way that would affect all
allike, instead of doing it at the expense of certain classes only.
The problem of discrimination by commission orders is one of
several indirectly raised by the central issue of commission regulaCt. 546, 77 L. Ed. 1080 (1933).
168 236 U. S. 585, 35 S. Ct. 429, 59 L. Ed. 735 (1915).
16o At p. 598.
267 289 U. S. 130, 53 S.
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tory authority. Others are the effect of local franchises or contracts, whether of prior existence or supervening; the factors which
must be considered in determining the appropriate unit for ratemaking; the.prescription of temporary rates; and the assessment
of the costs of rate-making proceedings against utilities affected.
The first of these questions has been considered in connection with
a West Virginia case, in an earlier chapter, where it was held that in
the absence of a clear showing of relinquishment of legislative
authority over utilities to the municipality, it might be exercised
in spite of a municipal contract or franchise.1 0 Other courts have
made the same decision on similar facts. In South Glens Falls v.
Public Service Comm.,171 the New York Court of Appeals sustained
the action of the commission in abrogating a municipal rate contract, saying, "every doubt must be resolved in favor of the continuance of the power in the state ... rate regulation is a matter
of the police power of the state, and ...a franchise to a service corporation may be modified without impairing the obligation of
contract.. ."
The question of the proper unit for rate regulation becomes
difficult where there are many cities or suburban districts in a
heavily populated area, so that boundaries are merely arbitrary
lines, or where large companies undertake to serve several towns
.n a given geographical district. As has been seen above, such
situations raise nice problems as to the extent of holding out to
serve and as to extensions of service. The problems of units for
rate-setting is seen in such cases as Wabash Valley Electric Co. v.
Young. 172 There the utility served approximately fifty cities. The
commission ordered a rate reduction in one town, treating it as a
unit for purposes of determining the proper rate. The company contended that its entire operating property should be taken as a unit
in fixing the rate base. The Supreme Court unanimously decided
that the commission's action was proper, because of the fact that
the utility's property was employed in serving entirely unrelated
citi, and other utilities, none of which should be compelled to pay
on the basis of the expense of serving others. This seems to be but
slightly different from the disinclination to make one person pay
the freight of another, expressed in the North Dakota case just
noted. There are of course many more complicated problems, inCharleston v. Public Service Comm, 95 W. Va. 91, 120 S. E. 398 (1923).
225 N. Y. 216, 121 N. E. 777 (1919).
172287 U. S.488, 53 S. Ct. 234, 77 L. Ed. 447 (1932).
170
171
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volving greater difficulty of determining just what is the fairest
boundary for a rate unit; in such cases greater latitude would undoubtedly be given to the commission in making the decision; the
principle, however, is clear, that the normal rate base may be split
in the interest of fairness to classes of consumers served by the
utility.
The prescription of temporary rates arises in this way: the
commission proposes to establish a new rate for a utility, but the
iuquiry will be lengthy; so to avoid delay, a temporary rate is
established effective until the commission can determine properly
what the final rate should be. This practice was condemned in
Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.,, 7 3 where the temporary
rate was held confiscatory. The temporary rates were final legislative acts as to the period during which they should remain in
effect, and if the rates were confiscatory there was as much reason
for relief as if it had been proposed to continue them in effect.
This decision established the necessity of a fair return on the
proper rate base for a temporary rate, and thus practically outlawed temporary rates; for if all the elements necessary for a final
rate are present, it might as well be set finally. However, in the
case of Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v. Maltbie,17 4 decided in 1936, the
New York Court of Appeals literally refused to follow the Prendergast case, first analyzing it and demonstrating its effect, then
pointing out that temporary rates are proper and necessary in
spite of the decision, and reaching the conclusion that the temporary rate before the court was quite proper. It was pointed out that
if the temporary rate were too low, it could be balanced by a
higher rate later, although that practice was disapproved in the
Prendergast case, and seems inconsistent with the Wabash Valley
Eectric Company and North Dakota doctrines. The New York
court treated the consumer class as a unit, but that seems to rest
on a not entirely justifiable assumption of constant use by each
consumer over a considerable period of time, whereas in the ease
of electric companies amounts of service will fluctuate from one
month to another.
A slightly different angle of the temporary rate question was
presented in a West Virginia case, where a temporary rate was
prescribed as an investigatory measure in order to aid in determining what the rate should be thereafter. This was held proper by
262 U. S. 43, 43 S. Ct. 466, 67 L. Ed. 853 (1923).
174 271 W. Y. 364, 3 N. E. (2d) 512 (1936).
173
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the state court, and the supreme court on review tacitly approved
the practice.'7
The ca~e was decided before the Pendergast decision, however, and it may be necessary to consider it overruled
by the later decision, especially as the precise point of temporary
rates was not decided by the court in the West Virginia case.
An earlier phase of the same litigation, as the New York case
discussed, 1'7 6 brought up the last problem to be discussed herethat of assessing utilities with the cost of rate regulation proceedings. It has always been held proper for such costs to be borne by
the public; it has also been regarded as constitutional for commission expenses to be charged to public utilities as a class, by a
special tax or otherwise. 1'77 West Virginia meets most commission
expenses with a special, flexible, license fee for all public service
companies. In the Bronx Gas & Electric Company case, however,
it was sought to make a utility which was the object of an investigation pay the expenses of such investigation. The court rejected
the utility's contention that the expenses should be spread among
all utilities, saying that there was no reason for charging those
which did not need investigating with the expenses of investigating
one whose rates had been questioned. This reasoning, of course, begs
the question of the fault of the investigated utility and of the
purity of the others, but there seems to be no due process objection
to such a practice, if a state wishes to follow it.
It would be impossible to cover adequately in a single section
all the matters arising under the general head of rate regulation as
such. All that has been done is to indicate a few of the problems
peculiar to the subject, which have been raised in one form or
another in the history of the West Virginia commission, with an
indication of their treatment in the leading cases in other jurisdictions, especially where no final decision has been rendered in
West Virginia. No exhaustive analysis of those cases has been undertaken; it has been deemed sufficient for the purposes of this
study to describe them briefly and to indicate their status as leading authorities in this field. It may be necessary to go into the ratebase cases somewhat more fully in order to give a fair picture of
that subject.
2. The Rate Base. A rate set by a commission must, in order
not to be confiscatory, allow the utility a fair return on the value
175 Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 89 W. Va.
736, 110 S. E. 205 (1921), 262 U. S. 679, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. [Ed. 1176 (1923).
176 Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Maltbie, 268 N. Y. 278, 197 N. E. 281 (1935).
177 Charlotte, C. & A. R. R. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 35 L. Ed. 1051 °(1890).
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of its "property," in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Three questions arise under this general principle. The first is,
what property shall be taken as the rate base; the second is, how
shall it be valued for rate purposes; and the third is, what is a fair
return on that value under existing circumstances? On the first
question there has never been a definite, positive, specific statenient, which has been judicially supported, as to just what factors
must be considered, and in what proportions the factors considered
'will be controlling, in determining the rate base. Implicit in the
precedents established by the Supreme Court decisions dealing with
the constitutional validity of commission-fixed rates, however, is
the "fair value" doctrine. This doctrine is a mixture of two different rules as to the essential factor in the rate base: the reproduction cost rule and the present value rule. These two things are
different, but they are confused in the decisions, especially as the
court has avoided an explicit statement as to what will be considered a satisfactory practice by a commission, but has in general
confined itself to condemning or approving the processes in specific
cases. A further complication has been the persistent disagreement
of some members of the court with the present fair value doctrine
and their dissenting or specially concurring opinions in many of
the cases.
The parent case on the point of the rate base is Smyth v.
Ames, 178 decided in 1898. During the nineties price levels had
reached low ebb, falling steadily from the panic of 1893 until the
decision in Smyth v. Ames. Utility property was not worth nearly
so much as had been paid for it, in most cases. The utility interests,
therefore, wished to capitalize original cost for their rate bases,
while the state argued on two grounds: that the state could regulate
rates, even if such rates left nothing above opreating expenses,
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment; and secondly that
the reasonableness of the railroads' profit in this case should be
computed upon the present value of the roads. The court, however,
affirmed an injunction against the rates, saying, per Mr. Justice
Harlan:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as
the
reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation
to
maintaining
a highway under legislative sanction must be the
fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience
of the public. And in order to ascertain that value, the original
178 169 U. S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418, 43 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
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cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under
particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required
to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration,
and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case."171
On this statement rests most of the law as to the proper rate
base, and the seven factors named in it have all had their day in
rate cases. Several possibilities of interpretation of the rule appear:
it might mean that all the elements of value named must be given
equal weight, or that a single element may be considered controlling, if all are considered, or that some elements are more important than others, depending on the facts of the particular case,
and that the judgment of the commission is conclusive in a given
case as to the proportionate weight to be given the different elements, or that that question is always reviewable by the courts; or
it might be merely an evidentiary rule, requiring reversal only
where there has been refusal to hear testimony bearing on the
various elements of value.
The case of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co.,18o indicated a
limit beyond which the doctrine of SmytL v. Ames would not be
carried. In that case the circuit court disapproved a rate because
the return yielded by it would be less than six per cent on the
valuation of the utility's property made by a special master. In reversing, largely on the valuation point, the court said:
"The city authorities acted in good faith, and they tried
.... to obtain from the company a statement of its property,
the power of refusing to encapitalization and earnings ....
force legislation ....ought to be exercised only in the clearest
cases . . . . it is not tolerable that its exercise should rest
securely upon the findings of a master. . . It is enough that
thd whole case leaves us in grave doubt." 8 '
This seems to put the onus on the company to prove a definite
fault in the rate, and to that extent to modify the duty of the ratesetting body to consider the proper elements in determining the
base.
In San Diego Land Co. v. National City,182 the court affirmed
At p. 546.
so 212 U. S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 148, 53 L. Ed. 371 (1909).
181 At pp. 8 and 18.
182 174 U. S. 739, 19 Ct. 804, 43 L. Ed. 1154 (1898).
179

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol47/iss4/4

8

Peairs: The West Virginia Public Service Commission: IV. Rate Regulation
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
291
a decision that the actual value of the property at the time the
rates were to be fixed, and not its original cost, was the proper
base on which to compute the rates. And in San Diego Land Co. v.
Jasper83 the commission fixed the value at $350,000, on the basis
of the replacement cost. The utility presented evidence of original
cost by which it claimed a valuation of $1,000,000, but the commission gave controlling weight to the lower reproduction cost
factor, and the Supreme Court held the rate fixed not confiscatory,
saying, "No doubt original cost may be considered . . . . In the
present case . . . it has very little importance indeed.' 1 8 4 Mr.
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion and seemed to regard the fair
value as the settled rate base:
"It no longer is open to dispute that under the Constitution 'what the company is entitled to .... is a fair return upon
the reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used
for the public'.. . . That is decided .... against the contention
that you are to take the actual cost of the plant. ... "I5
The modern issue was joined under different circumstances.
The fair value doctrine was evolved by those who wished to keep
utility rates down in time of depression and to make them suffer as
well as the rest of the business world when prices were abnormally
low. During and after the war, however, prices skyrocketed, and
by the twenties a fair return on the fair value rate base yielded a
tremendous rate on the original cost of the plant. Those who! wished
to keep utility operators from getting rich now shifted grqund in
order to prevent utilities from benefiting from the general wave
of prosperity. The new plan for a rate base was known as the
prudent investment base: the amount originally, prudently, invested in the utility property. Of course this new scheme worked
in only one direction; for if the conditions of 1898 should be repeated, the utilities would have a difficult time showing the prudence of an investment which had declined fifty per cent in value,
'f the commission wished to reduce rates for public convenience;
and under this theory the commission's action would be upheld
over the utility's protest in each case, thus satisfying the proponents of the theory, who wished to provide a method for making
the commission's action watertight
The prudent investment forces because a factor to be seriously
183 189

U. S. 439, 23 S. Ct. 571, 47 L. Ed. 892 (1902).

184 At p. 442.
1
85 Ibid.
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considered after the case of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Comm., 10 in which it was the subject of a lengthy
and carefully written dissent by Mir. Justice Brandeis, who seems
to have adopted the theory shortly before this case. That case involved rates which had been set by the Postmaster-General while
telephones were under federal control during the war, and continued by Southwestern Bell when it took its plant over again in
1919. The Missouri commission ordered the rates to be lowered,
after a hearing, and the circuit court of appeals sustained the
order, refusing to enjoin.
The Supreme Court reversed, Mr. Justice MeReynolds writing
the majority opinion. The company had in the commission hearing
produced a great deal of evidence as to the value of its property;
the total cost, reproduction cost, and existing values, allowing for
depreciation, were shown. The commission concluded that the estimates of the company's witnesses, engineers, accountants, and
other experts, were excessive, on the basis of appraisals of three of
the company's exchanges, made in 1913, 1914, and 1916. This was
held improper, the court saying:
"Obviously, the Commission undertook to value the
property without according any weight to the greatly enhanced
costs of material, labor, supplies, etc....
"It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair
return upon properties devoted to public service without
giving, consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the
time the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent forecast of probable future values made upon a view of all the
relevant circumstances, is essential. If the highly important
element of present costs is wholly disregarded such a forecast
becomes impossible. Estimates for to-morrow cannot ignore

prices of to-day.'

'187

Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent attacked the whole present
value theory of arriving at the rate base, saying that the rule of
Smyth v. Ames was legally and economically unsound. It rested, he
said, on a vicious logical circle, since value is calculated largely
from the return the property will produce, while the purpose of
rate investigation is to determine what return it shall be permitted
to produce. He also pointed out various difficulties from the
strictly scientific viewpoint of determining value-an obviously unsound argument if it stood alone, because value must be determined
'8o

262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981 (1923).
pp. 287-288.

187 At
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in many cases, including damage suits, and the mere difficulty of
sustaining the pure economic theory of such determinations should
not affect their legality, if men of business and legal experience
have approved them, as they have, in rate cases as in others.
Brandeis also objected to the present fair value rate base because of its instability, due to fluctuations in price levels, pointing
out that it is undesirable to have rates set for the future on an unstable rate base. To this it must be answered that it is also undesirable to have a rate base which will, though stable for a long
period of time, operate unfairly for a considerable part of that
period.
Brandeis' last point in favor of the prudent investment theory
was that it is definitely determinable, while there is no one definite
criterion which is always controlling, if ascertainable, in fixing the
present value rate base. This seems to be a telling point, and a
valid ground of criticism of the fair value theory, as developed by
the court. Obviously there should be a single standard which could
be relied on in all cases by commissions and utilities alike, and
which if faithfully observed would obviate the necessity for review in each case.
In any case, irrespective of the merits of the present value prudent investment issue, the new scheme announced by Mr. Justice
Brandeis (not an entirely new idea, but novel in this case) became
tremendously popular among those interested in curbing utility
earnings, and was widely cited by commissions in rate-cutting
orders to justify their decisions. It was not adopted by the Supreme
Court; subsequent decisions seem to have raised the problem of
analysis, whether the court in each case, though adhering to the
language of the "present value" doctrine, was not in reality
adopting to a degree the prudent investment rate base as the proper
standard. (It is worthy of note that many early cases might be
cited in support of the prudent investment theory, even though
they followed Smyth v. Ames.) A half-dozen recent decisions will
serve to illustrate this problem as to the court's trend.
In the case of Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Railroad
Comm.,18 the commission had ordered a rate reduction, after
finding that the rates established in 1928 were actually affording a
much higher return than the seven and one-half per cent which
they had been calculated to yield. The Supreme Court in refusing
Iss 289 U. S. 287, 53 S, Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. 1180 (1933).
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to order an injunction against the rate order said, "we do not sit
as a board of revision, but to enforce constitutional rights." The
commission had played fast and loose with the various elements
which must be considered under former decisions of the Court. The
Court in its opinion pointed out that such items as reproduction
cost are relevant factors which should have appropriate consideration, but said that such items had not been decided to furnish
exclusive tests. The Court proceeded to examine the figures offered
by the company and to reject them as unsound because of depression conditions, refused to upset the commission's findings or
to hold them to any single standard, and finally approved the order
as issued, a result which could have been reached properly by a
short cut without so much laborious lip-service to the Southwestern
Bell rule.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion in Clark's
Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Comm., 5 9 where an order refusing to consider franchise value as a part of 'the rate base was
affirmed. The court refused to admit the validity of the company's
testimony or to support the criticisms of the commission's findings.
The chief ground of attack on franchise and similar values in the
rate base seems to be that they are donations, not contributed by
the utilities themselves, and that the public should not have to
pay a return on property so acquired. Such items, however, are
often included. 190 It seems that the company should not be prevented from realizing a return on all its property, no matter what
the source, and that the mere fact that the property was acquired
by gift should not make any difference in the rate base. However,
such special values are normally not included in the definition of
"'present value" for rate purposes.
The case of Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 101 marks
a decided step toward the prudent investment theory. There the
commission had ordered rate reduction, and the district court had
issued an injunction against the enforcement of the order. Both
sides appealed, the company claiming that existing rates were too
low, and the commission contending for a reduction according to its
order. It was clear that the existing rates, and a fortiori the proposed rates, were confiscatory if the base were calculated ac189 291 U. S. 227. 54 S. Ct. 427, 78 L. Ed. 767 (1934).
190 Wisconsin Hydro-Electric Co. v. Railroad Comm., 208 Wis. 348, 243 N. W.
322 (1933) held that the present value of the utility's property included such
items.
91 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658, 78 L. Ed. 1182 (1934).
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cording to the usual technique. However, it appeared that the
company had been thriving, even under the supposedly confiscatory
rates, and had said that they were fair when the commission first
attacked them. The Court therefore refused to support the company's contentions, saying that by proving too much it had failed
altogether and that if the rates were confiscatory before, and the
company realized a profit on its investment, there was no reason to
believe that under changed conditions it might not do as well under
the decreased rates. The substance of the decision was that the
company might not claim the increment due to an improvement in
the general business level, and that if it was realizing a profit
according to the prudent investment rate base, the commission's
order would not be disturbed. The case is clearly wrong, so far as
the law of the Southwestern Bell case is concerned; it remains to be
determined whether it has to the extent that it is inconsistent with
that case overruled it as to the proper rate base theory.
A return to the orthodox view occurred in West v. Chesapeake
There the district court had pronounced the
commission's order confiscatory, after an independent calculation
of the value of the utility's property. The Supreme Court held
that the district court had erred in its determination of the fair
value of the property, and, consequently, that its conclusion that
the commission's order was confiscatory must be rejected. The
decree of the district court was affirmed, however, on another
ground: that regardless of whether the commission's order was
confiscatory as a matter of substance, they had not used the proper
imethod of calculating the rate base. Not only is substantive due
process necessary in these cases, but the procedure of the commission must conform to approved methods also, or the order will be
hold unconstitutional.
& Potomae Tel. Co.192

This case, in rejecting "translators" of dollar value obtained
from price trend indices, as not a constitutional method of calculating utility rate bases, seems a far cry from some of the earlier
cases which permitted extraordinarily sloppy commission procedure
in such cases and from the latitude which Mr. Justice Brandeis and
his adherents would permit commissions in these cases. However,
the case makes a desirable advance in this one respect: it affords
a definite unchanging, reliable standard of commission procedure,
which may be followed in future cases, and thus provides a much102

295 U. S. 662, 55 S. Ct. 894, 79 L. Ed. 1640 (1935).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1941

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 4
W. VA. PUBLIC SE RVICE COMMISSION
needed measure of certainty and predictability in this field of the
law.
That measure of predictability went through the window soon
afterwards, however, when the case of Railroad Comm. v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. 193 was decided, in January, 1938. The commission there used the historical cost method of determining the
rate base, approximating the prudent investment base in its result.
It was held that the finding was proper; the court merely rules
on the question as to whether the rate set was confiscatory, and not
as to whether procedural due process has been followed. The
opinion clearly disregards the West case; by implication it approves
the prudent investment rate base; and if it does these two things,
it renders a great deal of the law discussed in this section as well
as that to be covered in the next section, on valuation, academic;
because if the court will refuse to set aside a commission order
improperly arrived at, because it feels that no one has been seriously injured, the rules for ascertaining rate bases are reduced to
persuasiveness in their effect on rate-setting procedure. However,
there is yet time for another reversal of field by the court, and the
Pacific Gas & Electric case does not put a stop to discussion until
it has been sanctified by subsequent decisions. Therefore it may
be well to examine a few more cases before leaving the subject.
The case of Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,194 decided in
1909, represents the view that replacement cost is the determining
factor in the value of the property. The case involves the New York
eighty-cent gas law of 1906, and the issue of original cost versus
replacement cost was not directly argued, but was in the background. Mr. Justice Peckham in the opinion said: "... this increase
in value was part of the sum on which complainant was entitled to
a return . . . except where the property may have increased so
enormously in value as to render a rate permitting a reasonable
return on such increased value unjust to the public." On the paradoxical language of this last exception may be rested all the
"straddle" cases which are about to be considered.
9
The first of these was Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston,25
in 1921. There the method of ascertainment of "present value" was
not reproduction cost at present prices, .but estimated original cost
plus a percentage increase in recognition of the higher price level
302 U. S. 388, 58 S. Ct. 334, 82 L. Ed. 319 (1938).
'94 212 U. S. 19, 29 S. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382 (1909).
3.5 258 U. S. 388, 42 S. Ct. 351. 66 L. Ed. 678 (1922).
193
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(or a percentage of the difference between the historical reproduction as of 1913, and a prophesied "future plateau" price level).
The value reached was two-thirds what it would have been had
present reproduction cost been used, but the court held that the
valuation was proper, since the increase in price level was recognized and some weight was given to replacement cost, and that the
proportion in which various factors were used lay within the discretion of the rate-setting body.
Two years later, just after the Souttwestern Bell case, came
Georgia R. R. & Power Go. v. Railroad Comm.196 There the commission took, as its measure of ascertaining present value, reproduction cost as of 1914, instead of present reproduction cost, which
was seventy per cent higher. The only concession allowed the
present value theory was an addition of $125,000, to represent the
appreciation in land values. The discrepancy between the value as
found and the one which would have been found under proper
technique (according to the orthodox rule) was over four million
dollars. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who was almost always on the side of
the commission when the court divided, wrote the opinion, saying:
"The refusal of the commission to hold that, for rate making
purposes, the physical properties of a utility must be valued at the
replacement cost less depreciation was clearly correct." This flies
in the face of the orthodox doctrine, and makes it clear that there
wa§ still no one method by which the rate base had to be ascer97
tained.
The last of the great "straddle cases" was McCardle v. Indianpolis Water Go.,,9 8 decided in 1926. There the replacement
cost was over $21,000,000; the original cost was $13,000,000; the
commission found a valuation of $15,000,000; and the Court enjoined enforcement of the commission order, saying the value was
$19,000,000. The case, therefore, stands not for approval of either
the reproduction cost or the original cost theory, but merely for
disapproval of the proportion in which they were applied in
the case. The Court emphasized reproduction cost, evidently not

'Do262

U. S. 625, 43 S. Ct. 680, 67 L. Ed. 1144 (1923).
Mr. Justice Mc]enna wrote a telling dissent in this case, on the authority
of the Southwestern Bell case, decided less than a month prior to this decision,
and of the Bluefield Water Works case, decided the same day. (The Bluefield
case uill be dealt with later on a valuation point which was the main issue
involved. It adopted reproduction cost as the only proper rate base.) Mc:enna pointed out that there was no possible ground of distinction between
this case and the earlier ones, and challenged the majority to reconcile them
-which they had not done.
1Vs 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316 (1925).
297
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because it should be the only basis, but because in the case the
historical cost bases were so far off the proper basis as to be practically worthless for .calculation purposes. Mr. Justice Brandeis
wrote a strong dissent, feeling that the Georgia Railroadcase should
have been followed; and indeed, Mr. Justice Butler's statement
that "the commission, where price level is stabilized, may hold
that reproduction cost is a fair measure of present value for rate
making purposes," is an almost direct contradiction of Brandeis'
statement on the point in the Gerogia Railroad case, if the word
"may" is read, as it seems it should be, to mean "must."
In summary, it may be said that the authorities have carried
the "doctrine of Smyth v. Ames" a great deal further than would
have been necessary if the case had been read differently. It was
simply an authority for reducing utility price levels in accordance
with general business losses, and was not a holding that due
process required reproduction cost or present value to be used as
the controlling factor in determining the base for rate making purposes. The subsequent cases on present value have wavered a good
deal as to what is constitutionally required to be included in a consideration by a commission of the value of the utility's property
for rate purposes. Some, like the Southwestern Bell and Bluefield
Water Works cases, hold the commission pretty definitely to reproduction cost; others permit more or less laxity in decision where
reproduction cost is given some weight; some permit almost any
valuation where it appears that consideration was given to the
proper elements; and some of the seven factors mentioned by Mr.
Justice Harlan have been almost entirely ignored in subsequent
rate cases, at least since 1920. The sum total of the present value
cases would seem to indicate an, unwillingness on the part of the
court to lay down a definite rule for future application, and a
desire to review each case on its particular facts and to use the
language of earlier cases to substantiate the current decision. The
West case might be considered a final settlement of the question
were it not for the subsequent Pacific Gas & Electric case; the West
case is probably now of no greater significance than any other in
this field, and must be considered primarily an authority on procedural due process, and secondarily, as to the absolute necessity
of this particular procedure in these cases, a final thundering of
the old court before Gotterdammerung.
The status of the prudent investment theory is not yet sure; it
is certainly not yet the required method of determining the rate
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base, although it is today almost certain to be approved if applied.
It is used on occasion by state commissions, but state courts will
not permit it in all cases. 99 In 1930, the Minority Report of the
New York Commission for Revision of the P.ublic Service Commission Laws contained a "Bill to Enact the Prudent Basis of
Rate Regulation," which would have destroyed every vestige of
Many
the reproduction cost basis in commission calculations. 0°
legal writers advocate the general adoption of the system, and it
may become the general practice in a few years, without serious
objection by the Supreme Court."'
It is submitted here that the issue between prudent investment
and present value should be subdivided. First, as a practical matter,
it may be admitted that the prudent investment basis is the simplest
to calculate and the easiest to administer, that it requires the fewest
adjustments and mathematical and economic analyses of any of the
bases suggested, and that from the standpoint of simplicity, predictability, and enforceability of the law, it may be the most desirable. Second, from the constitutional standpoint, it is probable
that the injustice of the prudent investment basis may well be considered insufficient to constitute confiscation, or a taking of
property without due process in the sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question seems to boil down to the feeling of the
individual judge as to the degree of fairness required in these
cases by the Constitution. Cases have been decided on both sides
of the question, and nothing closer to a logical issue than that has
appeared. Today, since the Pacific Gas & Electric case, and probably until conditions such as those existing in 1898 are repeated,
the prudent investment basis will likely be upheld wherever
applied. Third, the moral question of fairness to the utility investor
is clearly answered in the negative by this basis of calculation.
Whether it is unconstitutional or not to do so, it is clearly and indisputably unfair to the investor in utility property to penalize
him by saying that because of the nature of the business in which
he is engaged he may not grow prosperous with the rest of the
199 Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 191 VWIs. 562, 211 N. W.

760 (1927).

20OSee NEW YorX LEGIsr-ATIVE Com0rrnE REPORTS (1930).

201 IJt should be remembered that the term "prudent investment" is not
properly used in a critical sense, according to Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the
Southwestern Bell dissent. However, in times of depression, when values decline greatly, it is doubtful if utility owners may rely on the "presumption
that their investment was made in the exercise of sound business judgment."
It is probable that the knife is single-bladed.
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world; that he may not partake of benefits arising from the
general rise in price levels, but must still value his property as of
the time he bought it, perhaps a quarter of a century ago, irrespective of the inflation that may have occurred in all other walks
of life. This penalty, if generally enforced, will tend to kill utility
business in times of expansion and will ultimately redound to the
injury of the public as well.202
3. The Rate of Return. The rate of return is the last element
necessary to be considered by the rate-fixing agency. It, multiplied
202 The problem which properly follows that of determining the rate base,
and precedes that of deciding the proper rate of return on it, is that of
valuation of the base. This at first blush would seem to be merely a question
of accounting methods, but there are really included two questions: the inclusion of doubtful items in the value to be measured by the aceountant, and
the propriety of the accounting method to be used. Most of the difficulties
arise in connection with the calculation of operating expenses, and the inclusion of various items such as bad debts and cost of rate )proceedings in them
(the questio.n being whether these costs should be borne by the utility investor
or the public receiving the service). See, in connection with this problem,
Chicago, . & St. P. R. R. v. Tompkins., 176 U. S. 167, 20 S. Ct. 336, 44 L.
Ed. 417 (1900) (constitutionally necessary to determine operating expenses-gross receipts a bad measure); Chicago & G. T. R. R.v. Wellman, 143 U. S.
329, 12 S. Ct. 400, 36 L. Ed. 176 (1892) ; Reno P. L. & W. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 298 Fed. 790 (D. C. Nev. 1923) (bad debts not deductible except
where company clearly mot at fault); Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson, 265 U. S.
47, 44 S.Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895 (1926); West Ohio Gas Co. v. !Public Utils.
Comm, 294 U. S. 63, 55 S. Ct. 316, 79 L. Ed. 761 (1935) (questions as to
treatment of expenses of rate litigation); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
259 U. S. 101, 42 S. Ct. 438, 66 L. Ed. 844 (1921) (Court cut allowance
for master's fees from $118,000 to $49,000, taking their own salaries as a
standard); Brymer v. Butler Water Co., 179 Pa. St. 231, 36 At 249 (1897)
(sinking funds, like interest on indebtedness, allowable only if indebtedness
incurred as approved'operating expense). As to difficulties of mechanics of
valuation, see 75 I. C. C. 1 (1918) (efforts of the L C. C. to value 'United
States railroads under the act of 1913); Be Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 10
P. U. R. (N. S.) 149 (1935) (extensive study of proposed methods of calculating depreciation, pointing out distortion caused by straight-line method,
usually used, and adopting a cumbersome substitute which seems not to obviate
difficulties, but merely to shift risk to company or errors inevitable without
an annual inventory and service analysis, practically impossible); Lindheimer
v. Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658, 78 L. Ed. 1182 (1934)
(straight-line method of calculating depreciation); Dayton P. L. Co. v. Public
Utilities Comm., 292 U. S.290, 54 S.Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267 (1934) (necessity
of allowing reserve for depreciation where company is consuming a corpus
such as a natural gas well) ; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 278 U.
S.300, 49 S.Ct. 150, 73 L. Ed. 390 (1929) (valuation by estoppel; company
may not alter book value, which is held a public representation of proper
value); Interstate Commerce Comm. v.New York, N. H. &
B.R.,287 U.
S.178, 53 S.Ct. 106, 77 L. Ed. 248 (1932) (going value, with other intangibles,
need not necessarily be awarded a separate valuation by commission). See
also, on going value, Hardman, Going Fal e.As Yalue for Purposes of Rate
.Yegulatfion (1918)i 25 W. V-A. L. Q. 89, and Iardman, BecenA Developm.ts in
;Begard to Bate Regulation (1924) 30 W. VA. L. Q. 70, severely criticzing
the inclusion of going value in rate cases. Space prevents lamore detailed dis.
cussion of the materials here referred to, which might otherwise be proper to
give a complete picture of the subject.
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by the rate base, produces the "fair return" guaranteed by the
Constitution. The rate of return, of course, varies with the feelings
of the commission or court which is the final arbiter of its reasonableness. The commissions are charged by the legislature with the
duty to establish rates fair both to the consumer and to the utility,
considering all economic factors relative to the investment of the
utility owner and to the needs of the consuming public, and the
approach of the commission is naturally colored by this background. The court, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with
the legality of the commission's action, and does not heed to consider many of the factors important in the commission's determination. In the cases, however, the reasonable return of the
commissions and the legal or nonconfiscatory return of the courts
have become somewhat confused, and for the purposes of an
empirical study they may be treated together.
The topic deserves little more than the comment that returns
of from four per cent or a little less to eleven per cent or a little
more have been held proper, on the one hand, in affirming lower
tribunals, and necessary, on the other hind, in cases reversing the
inferior tribunals. The variation in amounts seems to spring from
changing business levels and different business enterprises affected,
rather than from any formula of universal applicability. A few
cases will be presented here in addition to the foregoing summary,
chiefly because two West Virginia authorities are among the
leading cases in the field.
The case of Duluth Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm.,2 " presents a
caveat as to the powers of the particular commission involved. In
that case it was empowered to reduc rates which were unreasonably high; it undertook to reduce those of the street car company
here, because they yielded a return of more than seven and a half
per cent, which was considered an unreasonably high rate of return.
It was contended, however, that the action was not justified unless
the rates charged the public were unreasonably high, irrespective of
the profits the company might receive from them-an ingenious
argument of statutory construction which failed, however, in the
court, which advised a compromise by the company toward a rate
of seven and one-half per cent, according to the commission's
order, which was sustained.
In Huntington v. Public Service Comm., 204 the West Virginia
203161 Wis. 245, 152 N. W. 887 (1915).
204 89 W. Va. 703, 110 S. E. 192 (1921).
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commission established a rate which would yield nine per cent on
the value of the utility's property-two per cent for depreciation
and seven per cent for a fair return on the investment. The court
held that due to general rates of interest, business conditions, and
the relative degree of risk-incurred by the utility investor, compared to those of other enterprises, seven per cent was an unreasonably high yield on the rate base, and the increase granted by
the commission was consequently disallowed. The court was divided
three to two, and one of the majority wrote a special concurring
opinion. The decision of the commission was unanimous. This case
was continued before the commission for several years after the
decision by the court, and three supplemental orders were enteredall over a difference of one per cent more or less on the utility's
investment.
In Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public Service
Crom., 20 5 the commission entered a rate order which was carried
to the Supreme Court. The order was reversed on several points,
including valuation methods and rate base questions (the commission had failed to give sufficient weight to reproduction cost in
calculating the rate base). As to the rate of return, the Court after
reviewing Supreme Court cases on the point decided between 1906
and 1923, holding returns of from five to eight per cent proper,
decided that under the facts of the case a return of six per cent
was substantially too low to constitute just compensation. This
decision was contemporary with that above, holding seven per cent
too much, in the state court.
Contrasts with this 1923 case may be found in earlier and later
times; in 1903 a return of four per cent was held by the Supreme
Court not to be confiscatory, while in 1930 rates even below four per
cent have been tacitly approved. The temper of the times and the
complexion of the court make a tremendous difference in the way
they look at a balance sheet and a business index chart to approve
or disapprove a utility rate of charges.
4. West Virginia Rate Practices. It would not be profitable
to review here the many dicta in West Virginia rate cases citing
with approval Supreme Court authorities on the point. It may be
fairly assumed that West Virginia law is not peculiar with respect
to rate regulation, and that authorities generally respected elsewhere are valid in West Virginia. There are four or five cases
205 262 U. S. 679, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176 (1923).
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which represent the bulk of the West Virginia court's original
work on the subject, and these cases will be brought together here.
The present value rate base has long been accepted as proper
in West Virginia. In Huntington v. Public Service Comm., 0° the
question of the proper rate base for a telephone company was
involved. The present value theory was enunciated by the court,
which said that the utility was entitled to a reasonable return on
the full fair value of its property in public use. The opposing considerations-that the rate must not be so low as to be confiscatory,
nor so high as to be greater than the value of the service to the
consumer-were both set out by the court, which recognized the
necessity of a compromise by the commission. Some of the company's property was subject to a mortgage securing a debt incurred
in organizing the business. It was held that such property should
be included, and that a bonded lien on the property afforded no
reason for excluding it from the rate base, since in any case the
public was using property in which the utility had the beneficial
interest, and even the bondholdlers would prefer the property to
be productive. The utility had bought up the entire property of
a competing company shortly before this litigation. It was held
proper to include such property at the cost to the utility, even
though it had paid more than the property was actually worth. The
fact that the property was bought from a competing utility probably made the result different from that which would have followed
a holding company transaction. Another question raised in the case
was as to the allowance for interest on outstanding securities of the
company. It was held that the exact amount payable on such bonds
should be considered, and that an arbitrary allowance of seven per
cent would be improper, if the obligations were actually at five or
six per cent. A similar question was raised with regard to the
reasonableness of the rate of return; the commission had arbitrarily
considered six per cent, the legal rate of interest, a fair return. It
was held that general business conditions and the situation of the
utility might be such that a proper return would be either greater
or less than the legal rate of interest. The commission had calculated
the difference between the value of the utility's property and its
outstanding debts, and allowed a return of six per cent on that
difference, plus an arbitrary amount to take care of interest on the
20 89 _W. Va. 703, 110 S. E. 192 (1921), aff'd, 91 W. Va. 346, 112 S. E.
571 (1922); the same litigation went back up in 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S. E.
144 (1926) where the decision was finally rendered. (See note 204 supra.)
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utility's bonds, which were assumed to be at seven per cent. The
order was upset for the several reasons noted above.
The case of Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public
Service Comm.,2 07 went to the United States Supreme Court, and
both the final decision and the unreversed portions of the West
Virginia court's opinion are important legal sources in this study.
The Supreme Court decision, condemning the rate set because it
did not conform to approved valuation methods of the present
value theory is, as has been seen, a leading case on fair value. A
return of six per cent was there held too low a rate for a utility in
West Virginia in 1923, but the decision on that point did not
purport to go further than the facts of the case. The lower court
had approved the -establishment of a temporary rate for the
purpose of ascertaining what the proper rate should be, as a
means of calculation. However, one factor entering into the court's
approval of that rate, as distinct from the ground noted above in
section 3, may have been the fact that the guinea-pig rate was an
eminently fair one, so far as the utility was concerned-eight per
cent. The Bluefield case attempted to limit the value of the utility's
water rights to the aniount paid for them, saying that where there
was a natural source of supply anyway, such extra value claims
were extremely tenuous. The strength of the holding is somewhat
limited by the Supreme Court's reversal of the valuation, since it
was placed in original-cost language; it seems, however, to be
merely a refinement of the present value doctrine, and proper
under the Supreme Court's ruling. The case is also authority for
consideration of such a factor as the current high cost of living in
calculating rates.
The case of Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley,"" a pre-commission
decision, is widely cited by West Virginia lawyers in rate cases,
and appears in many commission opinions. In that case the railroad
had been built without any expectation of profit, merely to break
even on coal traffic. -It was held in that case that the lack of expectation of profit was no reason to deny one to the railroad if it
later proved possible to make one without charging unreasonable
rates. On the other point raised in the case, as to the treatment
of earnings applied to the purchase of new equipment, it was held
that for rate purposes they should be considered as net earnings.
207 89 W. Va. 736, 110 S. E. 205 (1921), partially -rev'd, 262 U. S. 679, 43
S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176 (1923).
20s 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613 (1910).
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In the ease of Charleston 'v. Public Service Comm., 20 9 the
company attempted to include in the rate base the amount of a
discount at which its bonds *had been issued. It was held that such
a discount was merely an adjustment of the interest rate, and
should be amortized over the life of the securities. Judge Meredith,
who wrote the opinion, expressed regret at being unable to throw
the entire present value doctrine overboard and follow the prudent
investment theory, but the court regarded itself as bound by the
Southwestern Bell and Bluefield decisions. It was also held in the
case that income taxes might be charged up as operating expenses
by the company, but that; excess profits taxes could not-a reasonable distinction, since the latter tax does not arise from work done
for the public.21 0
In integrating the West Virginia commission practices with
those of similar agencies in other jurisdictions over the country, it
should be remembered that such practices exhibit appreciable
variety, although almost all have borrowed from one another. Of
the three type leaders in this field. Wisconsin may be said to represent
more nearly than either New York or California21 ' the West Virginia practices. Of course, West Virginia has attempted no such
active regulation of such items as operating expenses as may be
found in Ohio, Wisconsin, or Oregon (which ihas all utilities on
budgets). Although detailed rep6rts are required of all utilities, the
active utilization of such regulatory powers as the commission may
have is rarely pointed toward rate regulation. Rate proceedings
in West Virginia are almost always on complaint by a municipality or other consumer group served by the utility, or by the
utility itself. 12
In concluding the discussion of rate regulation, it may be
pointed out that the cases noted from other jurisdictions, and in
the Supreme Court, should be considered of as much value in pre91, 120 S. E. 398 (1924).
210 See Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 95 W. Va. 557, 121 S. E.
716 (1924); Chesapeake & 0. R. R. v. Public Service Comm., 75 W. Va. 100,
83 S. E. 286 (1915); and Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 84 W. Va. 638, 100 S. E. 551 (1919), for other oints raised' in the
West Virginia cases dealing with this topic.
21 See Waukesha Gas & Elee. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 181 Wis. 281, 194
N. W. 846 (1923), 191 Wis. 565, 211 N. W. 760 (1927); Be City of New
London, P. U. R. 1931E 369 (Wis. Public Service Comm. 1931); of. Topping
v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 2 W. Va. P. S.C. 658 (1928); Be West
Virginia Central Gas Co., 2 W. Va. P. S.C. 210 (1924).
22 Fewer than twenty investigations have been initiated by the commission
on its own motion, in rate cases, which have resulted in affirmative orders for
rate changes, in over a quarter of a century.
209 95 W. Va.
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dieting the course which the West Virginia court will follow as the
West Virginia cases themselves. The law on the subject is in many
respects not settled, but it is sufficiently generalized so that the
same doubtful points may be found in other jurisdictions, and what
issettled in Wisconsin is probably settled in West Virginia.
V.

PRoCEDURE AND RvIEW.

1. Procedure and Sanctions. The West Virginia Public
Service Commission statute contains three provisions relating to
procedure. The first grants to the commission power to prescribe
rules of procedure and evidence, and provides that the commission
"shall not be bound by the technical rules'of pleading and evidence, but in that respect may exercise such discretion as will
facilitate its efforts to understand and learn all the facts bearing
on the right and justice of the matter before it."2 13
The second provision concerns procedure for changing rates.
The restrictions as to notice, filing schedules, and clear statements
as to the rates to be charged apply to utilities and not to the commission, which is authorized to suspend and to change rates on
less notice than that provided for in the statute. The commission
has power to suspend rates pending hearings for periods of up to
eight months; the burden of proof in all rate cases is placed on
the utility, and the commission has discretionary power to require
or to dispense with pleadings. Notice to the public by publication
is permitted where more than twenty persons are affected by a
2 14
rate change.
Where a utility has violated the provisions of the act, procedure by any person aggrieved is by petition to the commission,
which thereupon investigates and takes proper action in the courts,
after a warning to the utility analogous to the common-law rule to
show cause. If the utility makes reparation to private persons injured by any violation of the act, and otherwise purges itself and
promises to behave, court remedies are cut off.2"
Pursuant to the first provision cited above, the commission
prescribed a set of rules for practice and procedure before it in
213W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 9, § 2; W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 1, § 7.
The definition of the word "technical" in the statute, of course, is at the
root of all the problems arising under it, whether constructional or constitutional.
=414.
Va. Acts 1913, c. 9, § 9; W. Va. REv. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 2, §14.
See as to the burden of proof point, Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Public
Service Comm., 101 W. Va. 63, 132 S. E. 491 (1926).
21r5W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 9, § 11; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 4, § 6.
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1915; substantially the same rules are in effect today, since the last
revision in 1931.16 Of the twenty-two rules in force today, eight
are purely formal, relating to office hours, records, witness fees,
certified copies, and similar matters. The important rules provide
for the style, joinder and intervention of parties, the form and
service of complaints, the form and contents of answers, and
amendments, covering matters of pleading. Ancillary rules deal
with interrogatories accompanying pleadings, with admission of
cases on complaint only, and with special requirements for 'applications to change rates. Other provisions deal with procedure
on hearings, testimony, stipulation of facts, depositions, briefs, and
rehearing and reopening cases. There has been no litigation questioning the propriety of any of these rules; no one has claimed lack
of due process because of the nature of the procedure afforded
thereby.
Many of the leading cases decided under the Public Service
Commission Act have involved points of procedure, raised incidentally, to pad the grounds for appeal, and decided in almost the
same spirit, but none have been fought on the sole issue that the
procedure was improper under the constitution or statute.
The case of Randall Gas Co. v. Star Glass Co.,2 17 raised a few
procedural points. There it was held that the provision in the
statute requiring notice to the utility and to the public of any order
of the commission changing rates did not require individual notice
to the patrons of the gas company, and that the order was not
invalid because of the lack of such notice. However, the order, even
if valid, did not operate per se to change existing rates, but rather
as a permission to the utility to do so, and in that case, where the
utility had failed to file a new schedule of rates with the commission, the new rates were adjudged not to have been in effect.
216 RULES

OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDUIRE,

PUBLIC

SERVICE

COMMISSION

OF

WEST VIRGIxLA, (Charleston, 1931). As! to the right to raise federal constitational issues in general, see Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Public Service Comm., 91
W. Va. 414, 113 S. E. 247 (1922), holding the process before the commission,
with the accompanying right to review in the Supreme Court of Appeals,
sufficient under the fourteenth amendment.
217 78 W. Va. 252, 88 S. E. 840 (1915).
See Wheeling v. Benwood-McMechen
Water Co., 115 W. Va. 353, 176 S. E. 234 (1934), decided under the section
cited u pra n. 214, requiring such notice by a company before a rate change.
218s90 W. Va. 1, 110 S. E. 475 (1922). In an earlier case under the same
style [81 W. Va. 457, 94 S. E. 545 (1917)], the commission ordered the railroad to furnish cars on X's siding for Y's use, with X's consent. X and the
railroad had a contract in force at the time of the order providing that such
service would not be rendered to others without the consent of both parties.
The order was upheld over the railroad's claim that it impaired the obligation
of contract, the court saying that in order successfully to contest the validity
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In Baltimore & O7tio R. R. v. Public Service Comm.,218 a
private manufacturer entered a complaint and obtained an order
requiring the railroad to provide additional facilities (siding and
switch). Both sides filed pleadings and took evidence before the
commission. It was held that the utility company might not later
complain of lack of opportunity to be heard or of lack of notice.
Attacks on the proceedings because of the commission's act in
examining matters beyond the issues raised by the parties also
failed, because the commission is not bound by "technical rules of
pleading and evidence."
In Weil v. Black,219 it was held that the commission must enforce a proper rate order by going to court and seeking the statutory remedies, and that if it is sued to enjoin enforcement, it must
defend such suit diligently. The commissioners' acts are official,
not private, and they have no choice in the matter.
In addition to the imposition of this duty on the commission,
the court will permit a -private individual to sue to enforce a commission order,"22 although this remedy is infrequently sought, the
commoner method being to apply for a writ of mandamus to the
commission.
The statute provides severe penalties for violations of the
Public Service Commission Act: for the first offense, the offender
is fined up to a maximum of a thousand dollars, and may be imprisoned for a maximum of one year; for the second offense, and
for subsequent offenses, the maximum fines are greatly increased
(the highest being- five thousand dollars) and minimum fines and
imprisonments are provided for., That this section could be interpreted to make noncompliance with the act a serious matter is
indicated by the fact that each day of noncompliance constitutes a
separate offense. Separate penalties are provided for falsifying,
destroying, or altering entries in books, or other statements, and
for violating certain important commission orders, and blanket
penalties cover offenses against the commission not otherwise provided for. The Public Service Commission is also given the right
to punish for contempt, just as the circuit courts. Full damages
of the order the railroad must show proof of the lack of reasonableness thereof and of necessity for the use by Y of the siding.
219 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (1916).
220 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 90 W. Va. 74, 110 S. E.

489 (1922).
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are recoverable in civil actions by private parties injured by any
violation of the act.22
The article of the statute providing for penalties has been invoked in only a few cases, and the severity of the penalties, and
the nature thereof, have never been questioned. It is sufficient,
therefore, to indicate their nature, without dwelling further on
them. The provisions of this article are substantially similar to
those in other states, and were taken from those in force under the
222
Wisconsin and Virginia acts.
2. Review of the Commission's Action. The subject of judicial review of administrative action is too large for adequate discussion here of the whole field. Even the particular phase of the
subject concerning public utility commissions is beyond the scope
of this section, and would probably be a fit subject in itself for an
administrative study. For our purposes the subject may be treated
from the standpoint of the following three items, especially important in the West Virginia law.
a. The act provides for review of final orders of the commission as follows: Any party feeling aggrieved by any final order
may within thirty days petition to the Supreme Court of Appeals,
praying for the suspension of the order. After a hearing by the
court, it shall decide the matter in controversy as seems to be just
2 23
and right..
There are various minor provisions in the statute as
to form, procedure, and limitations, but the essence is the final determination by the court upon petition of the correctness of a commission order.
221 W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 9, §§ 17, 18; W. Va. Acts 1915, c. 8, §§ 23, 26, 27,
28; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 24, art. 4.
222 Several Supreme Court cases establishing what may be termed the "law
of the land" on the subject of procedure may be indicated here, although
they raise questions which cannot be given thorough consideration -in this
article: Southern R. R. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190, 51 S. t..148, 78 L. Ed.
186 (1933); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States, 261 U. S. 258, 44 S. Ct.
317, 68 L. Ed. 667 (1924) (note the interesting division of the Court in this
case); Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U. S. 292, 57 S.
Ct. 724, 81 L. Ed. 1093 (1937) ; Morgan v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 766, 298
U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed. 1288 (1936), 23 F. Supp. 380, 304 U. S. 1,
58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 1129 (1938), 24 F. Supp. 214, 304 U. S. 590, 58'S. Ct.
999 (1938) (this much-trampled controversy demonstrates several possible new
departures in this field, on the general question of "a reasonably fair hearing", the standard limited by earlier courts. Its chief purpose is to stir up
the field, and it may be said that in spite of early decisions almost anything
in the nature of hearing may now be approved on the one hand or required
on the other, until the Court crystallizes its position on the point.)
223 W Va, Acts 1913, c. 9, § 16; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 5, § 1.
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b. The case of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,2"
decided in 1920, involved an appeal by the utility from a commission ruling on the ground that the valuation by the commission
of the company's property made rates based on it in effect confiscatory. The superior court, reviewing, substituted its own valuation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the reviewing
court in exercising an independent judgment upon the proper
valuation to be placed on various property items had exceeded its
jurisdiction, because there was some evidence to support the commission's finding. The supreme court held that such an independent judgment by the reviewing court must be afforded, under
the due process clause. The holding in the case, which has since
come to be known as the Ben Avon Borough doctrine, has become
crystallized in the law; reviewing courts in utility rate cases, at
least, must exercise an independent judgment as to both matters
of law and of fact, if a question of confiscation is involved, under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
c. The Constitution of the State of West Virginia provides
that "the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers
properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same
time .... ,,125This clause has been held to prevent the exercise by
any court of any power of a legislative nature. The court refused
to assume the power to determine whether the qualifications
established by the legislature to practice medicine existed in any
given case,228 saying that such determinations were legislative in
nature and not exercisable by the judicial branch. Such decisions
illustrate the very strict interpretation of the clause given it by the
West Virginia court.
The history of the right to judicial review of administrative
decisions goes back to the heyday of the Railroad Commissions,
after Munn v. Illinois, and may be traced to the Ben Avon Borough
case, and since that leading decision through several qualifications
and attempted qualifications, and :much criticism. It is best, for
purposes of this study, to treat the doctrine of the Ben Avon
Borough case as settled, that the parties may not constitutionally
be deprived of the right to a complete judicial review of law and
224253

U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920).

225 W. VA. CoNsr.

(1872) art. V.

State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1 (1887); aff'd Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.
S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed. 623 (1889).
226
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facts. The case has been much discussed elsewhere, to an extent
which would render it useless duplication to trace in detail the
course of decisions indicated above. It seems that considerations of
f-mdamental fairness would compel the result of the Ben Avon
Borough case, but the question, as will be seen, has been rendered
largely academic in this jurisdiction. It may be indicated in passing
that the recent course of Supreme Court cases may indicate that
the rule is on its way out.227
The first judicial review case decided after the Public Service
Commission Act, in 1914, indicated the problem which has since
existed, of a conflict between the Ben Avon rule and the West Virginia separation of powers clause, which had previously been interpreted to be a rigid restriction on the functioning of the
courts. 2"8 In 'UnitedFuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 29 the
company sought review under the act of a commission order concerning rates and discrimination in service, claiming a violation
of the due process clause, among other grounds. It was held that
the separation of powers clause prevented consideration by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of any matter legislative, executive, or
merely administrative in nature, on appeal from any inferior tribunal, unless power to consider such matters had been expressly
conferred by the constitution. Since the rate making power is
legislative, the court refused to substitute its judgment for that of
the commission as to reasonableness, although the review provision
of the statute was not entirely nullified. It was held to give the
court jurisdiction akin to mandamus or prohibition, and hence to
grant relief against commission orders based on mistakes of law.
This seems to extend review to about the extent of that defined by
the Illinois Central and Union Pacific cases, but is in definite conflict with ths Ben Avon case, decided six years later. It is possible
that had the Supreme Court enunciated the requirement of an independent judgment as to both law and fact, before this decision,
227 The conflict raised by the Ben Avon Borough case is discussed in Hardman, Bxtent of the Finality of Com7nission's Rate Begulations .(1922) 28 W.
VA. L. Q. 111, taking the point of view, contemporary, that the Ben Avon
Borough case was a mistaken decision.
228For a thorough review of cases of review in West Virginia, see Davis,
Judicial Beview in West Virgini-A Study in Separation of Pcolers '(1938)
44 W. VA. L. Q. 270, discussing the problem in detail, from the standpoint not
only of public service law, but also of review of the decisions in the fields of
taxation, workmen's compensation, and various other administrative tasks.
This article is cited for its review of the materials; the opinions expressed
therein are the author's own.
229

73 W. Va. 5 1, 80 S. E. 931 (1914).
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the West Virginia leading ease would have been worked out otherwise. What is important is that it did not and that the West Virginia court seems to have elected to follow its own rule rather than
that of the Supreme Court. The West Virginia Constitution, as interpreted by the United Fui Gas case, and the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by the Ben Avon ease, are in direct conflict, and
the West Virginia court, constituted under the West Virginia Constitution, logically follows it-raising an interesting problem of
state's rights, the power of the Supreme Court to force a state to
follow the Federal Constitution.
A recent decision on the problem, Hodges v. Public Service
Comm.,2 3 0 settled what had been in doubt, whether the West Virginia court would actually follow the United Fuel Gas case where
the issue between it and the Ben Avon doctrine was clearly presented. The ease involved a license granted by the commission to
build a dam on Cheat River, in a proceeding in which the application was resisted by various interested citizens of the state. The
license was granted under the Water Power Act of 1929, and an
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Appeals under the provision of that act for "appeal to the circuit court with trial de novo
in that court." The Kanawha County Circuit Court had reversed
the commission order. The court, reversing both the commission
order and the circuit court decision, held the provision for appeal
was a violation of the separation of powers provision and unconstitutional. The case is a landmark in this subject, and seems to
settle the law in West Virginia, even though public utility lawyers
have been greatly shocked by it and have protested it as an impossible case under the Federal Constitution.2 31 The case rests
on a sufficiently firm foundation of West Virginia cases so that it
seems to have at least as good a chance of remaining law as the
Ben Avon ease does, and it would be idle to speculate as to which
will fall first. It is submitted that there is no valid ground of
criticism of the opinion, except that it ignores the Ben Avon case
and that, so far as the face of the opinion is concerned, the
Supreme Court rule has not been cast aside but merely has not
been considered by a court not primarily concerned with it.
The Hodges case is in line with earlier cases involving licenses
159 S. E. 834 (1931).
See Davis, supra n.228, at pp. 352-360. See Donley, The Hodges Case
;and Beyond '(1939) 45'W. VA. L. q. 291, 1or a telling criticism of the position
taken by Mr. Davis in this article, and a reiteration by the latter of his views
the Hodges Case (1939) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 316.
in A Final Word oan
2:30 110 W. Va. 649,
231
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to build dams under the Hydra-Electric Power Act of 1915. In
Howell v. Public Service Comn1.,232 the court refused to review
an order of the Public Service Commission granting permission
to build a dam, saying that the granting of such permission was
a "purely legislative function" and that, since no review of such
orders was specifically provided for in the Hydro-Electric Power
Act, the general provisions of the Public Service Commission* Act
would not be extended to authorize such review. The court seemed
to feel that review of any sort over a commission exercising legislative functions would be such an extraordinary practice that it
would not be presumed that the legislature had intended it, in
the absence of a specific provision. The decision was, of course,
one of statutory interpretation, refusing under the statute to exercise even the mandamus-prohibition review it permits itself,
while the Hodges case was a constitutional decision, refusing to
exercise review of factual matters where the power is conferred
by statute.
The decision in the Howell ease was reiterated in Royal Glen
Land & Lumber Co. v. Public Service Comm., 23 3 although even
there the decision was based on the statute, and the rule was not
made a matter of constitutional law, as it was in the Hodges ease.
In the Royal Glen Lumber ease the commission had awarded
permission to a power company to build a dam across the South
Branch of the Potomac. The lumber company petitioned for review, contesting the order. In refusing the petition, the court said:
"The power so delegated . . is legislative in its character, and
amounts to nothing more than a grant of a legislative permit or
charter . . . instead of granting a p rmit or franchise direct
by legislative enactment, the lawmaking body has seen fit to delegate this function to a state agency peculiarly fitted for that
purpose .... whether the act of the Commission in granting the
permit is legislative, judicial, or administrative, or whether it is
a mixture of these governmental functions, it is unnecessary to
determine .... the statute provides for no appeal .... " 3 4
The only direct issue ever joined on this point and carried
78 W. Va. 664, 90 S. E. 105 (1916).
V. Va. 446, 113 S. E.749 (1922).
234 Cases involving other administrative bodies and stating the same rule as
to the constitutional necessity of commission finality as the Hodges doctrine
are: Danielly v. Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S. E. 620 (1933) (State
Water Commission-act held unconstitutional because of review provision),
and Staud v. Sill, 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S.E. 428 (1933) (foreclosure sales
reviewable by circuit court under statute, held bad under the constitution).
232

23391

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1941

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 4
W. VA. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
to the highest court was in the Bluefield Water Works case, where
the Supreme Court held that the water company could carry the
case to that tribunal if the rate was challenged as confiscatory
and had been upheld by the state court. One of the grounds for
reversal in the case was the refusal of the court below to exercise
an independent judgment on questions of fact as well as on legal
questions. The question involved, as to the rate base and proper
rate of return, was a legal one, but the Supreme Court went
slightly out of its way to disapprove the West Virginia rule of
administrative finality on questions of fact.
In Charleston v. Public Service Comm., 23, the constitutional
issue was not raised, but the court held that the "jury rule" would
be applied, and the scope of review exercised Was restricted to an
ascertainment of the existence of competent evidence upon which
to rest the commission order. There, as in Weil v. Black,230 State
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 237 and the RoyaZ Glen Lumber case,
the court seems to have had some difficulty in keeping the nature
of commission action straight under definitions. The struggle to
keep their activities properly classified, noted in these opinions,
is a strong argument for those who claim that the whole doctrine
of separation of powers is an unsatisfactory one and should be
238
thrown overboard in favor of a more realistic rule.
The leading cases thus far discussed are by no means the
only holdings of the West Virginia court on the point. In Bluefield Telephone Go. v. Public Service Comm.,23 1 it was held that
review would be granted only to keep the commission within the
law and to protect constitutional rights, and that a commission
order would not be annulled unless it was an unlawful, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power. In effect, of course, the determination of this question would necessitate a judicial review
of the proceedings of the commission, but the rule as stated is
quite consistent with the court's refusal- to review questions of
fact. In Huntington v. Public Service Comm., 240 the rule was
stated that there would be no interference with a rate order, unless
35 86 W. Va. 536, 103 S. E. 673 (1918).

236 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. "B.666 (1916).

237 76 W. Va. 399, 85 S. E. 714 (1915) ("the powers exercised are quasilegislative, quasi-judicial, and administrative").
2 8 See, on this subject, Hardman, supra n. 227, criticizing the Ben Avon

doctrine.

239 102 W. Va. 296, 135 S. E. 833 (1926) (type of evidence on which commission based order-history of the utility, not expert witnesses' testimony
-held not disturbable).
240 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S. E. 144 (1926).
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it appeared that there was (1) an unconstitutional exercise of
power by the commission, (2) an exercise of power not conferred
by the statute, (3) a mistake of law by the commission, (4) a
rate so low as to be confiscatory, and to deny due process, or (5)
an order arbitrarily contrary to the evidence, or without evidence
to support it. Other statements of the rule have been: that while
a rate order will be reviewed where there has been a misapplication of law, findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal;241
that findings of fact will not be disturbed unless contrary to the
evidence, or there was no evidence to support them;242 and that
where there is a substantial conflict of evidence on any question
of fact, the commission's action in determining the probative
value to be accorded it will not be disturbed. 43
The reluctance of the West Virginia court to determine questions of fact may be due to an unwillingness to apply to fact
situations the criterion set up by the word "reasonable," in rate
cases any more than in tort cases, where that is ordinarily left to
the jury. This is expressed in opinions stating that the court will
not review "questions of policy," or in the more recent state
ments that "the court will not determine the reasonableness of
rates. "2 44
This interpretation of the motivation of the rule, which may
help to delimit it, is supported by contrast in Natural Gas Co. v.
Sommervifle, 24" where the rate had been set by the commission,
and consumers went into court to claim that the utility was overcharging. It was held that the court would decide the issue as a
judicial question and that there was no need for the plaintiff first
to exhaust his administrative remedy. These cases, of course, do
241 Harrisville v. Public Service Comm., 103 W. Va. 526, 138 S.E. 99 (1927).
See also Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 101 W. 'Va. 63,
132 S.E. 497 (1926), where it seems that administrative finality as to a -ate
order was held proper, although the constitutional necessity of such a holding
was2 not mentioned.
42 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Public Service Comm., 90 W. Va. 1, 11Q S. E.
475 (1922); MacKubin v. Public Service Comm., 95 W. Va. 546, 11 S. E. 731
(1924), where a commission order refusing to stop trains at a certain station
was upheld.
243 See Pittsburgh Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., and Harrisville v. Public
Service Comm., both supra n. 241. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 103 W. Va. 306, 138 S.E. 388 (1927), is an example of an "arbitrary"
order of the commission, "contrary to the evidence", where the order would
have duplicated service, and forced one utility out of business; it is one of
the few reversals of the commission by the court in this Iort of case. The
rule stated, however, is the same; the court will not interfere with commission
orders in matters of policy.
244 Wilson v. Brennan, 114 W. Va. 777, 174 S.E. 696 (1934).
245113 W. Va. 100, 166 S.E.852 (1933).
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not definitely point the reason for the rule of administrative selfsufficiency where the commission decides questions of fact; they
merely delimit the rule and show that it is restricted to cases
where the commission has acted or where the court may not act
initially.246
The Virginia cases have exhibited the same slowness on the
part of the court to reverse the Corporation Commission, when
matters of fact are appealed. There, however, the rule of commission finality rests not on the constitutional separation of
powers provision, but on the provision for review, which is ineluded in the Virginia Constitution, which is merely their parallel
to the West Virginia review statute in the act. The provision
reads that "the action of the commission appealed from shall be
taken as prima facie just, reasonable, and correct. 2 47 This undoubtedly governs in such cases as the determination of reasonable
rates, but does not afford a satisfactory explanation of such a case
as Carroll v. Commonwealth,24" where the reviewing court refused
to consider evidence as to whether an applicant for a license was
operating a motor vehicle on February 28, 1923, treating the commission finding as conclusive and refusing the certificate. There
appear to be no cases in which the corporation commission has
been reversed on questions of fact, although some of the rate cases
involved what have been called mixed qiestions, under the Virginia statute. The Virginia rule cannot be said to be the same as
that in force in West Virginia, resting as it does on a different
legal foundation, but the results reached in that court seem to be
the same as those reached under the West Virginia rule, without
the direct defy to the Ben Avon rule."'
The objection of the West Virginia court to the idea of a full
judicial review of matters of fact has been urged on other courts,
most of which refuse to give it controlling weight. A leading case
on the question is Duluth v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm. of Minnesota.2 50 There the statute provided for a hearing do novo on
review by the court of a commission order revaluing a street-car
company's property. It was contended that to do this the court
246 See also on this point, accord, Charleston Apts. Corp. v. Appalachian
Electrie Power Co., 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S. E. 294 (1937).
247 VA. COST. § 156 (f).
248 140 Va. 305, 125 S. E. 433 (1924).
249 See Powell, The Relation between the Virginia Caurt of AppeaUs and
t7e State Corporation Coinmission (1933) 19 VA. L. REV. 433, dealing with
some of the Virginia cases on judicial review in a general fashion.
25 167 Minn. 311, 209 N. W. 10 (1926).
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must exercise legislative power, but the court held that the statute
did not make that requirement, since the court under it had neither
the power to fix a new rate nor to modify the one under review,
but merely to "affirm, modify, or reverse the finding of the
commission according to law." Were it not for the last three
wvords, begging the question, it would seem clear that the power
to modify a commission order included the power to modify the
rate set by that agency; it is not entirely clear even under the
statute as it stands that such is not the case.251 However, under
Ather Minnesota decisions it is clear that the power of review exercised in that state is judicial, not legislative, and such appears to
be the general rule.25
In concluding the subject of judicial review not mluch can be
said to clarify the West Virginia law, beyond what has already
been noted in the course of the discussion. The authority of that
jurisdiction is settled, so far as present precedents are concerned,
by the United Fuel Gas case and the Hodges case. The conflict
between the West Virginia rule and the Ben Avon Borough doctrine also seems clear. The reason for the West Virginia rule is
clearly stated in the cases; the motive behind the decisions is not
so clear. To attempt to ascertain that motive involves a teleological
surmise that perhaps should not be made in a study of this sort.
It seems, however, that the rule is merely a manifestation of the
reluctance of the court, observed elsewhere, to reverse the commission on any decision, where it seems that the commission is
just as well qualified to pass on the matter in issue as the court.
It is submitted that this rule is, from the standpoint of practical
statesmanship, much more workable than the Ben Avon rule, and
at least as likely to achieve a desirable result, given, what we
must assume, an honest and able commission.
It is interesting to note that the West Virginia court, which is
a conservative court, by a very strict and conservative interpretation of the separation of powers clause and of the public service
commission law, reaches the result advocated by the element of
the Supreme Court generally regarded as the liberal faction, on
the due process question, which is directly contrary to the Ben
251 The rate set by the commission was enjoined by the federal court, in spite
of this decision; the street car company was held not bound by the statutory
method of obtaining relief from the commission order. Railroad & Warehouse Comm. v. Duluth St. Ry., 4 F. (2d) 543 (D. C. Minn. 1924), aff'd 273
U. S. 625, 47 S. Ct. 489, 71 L. Ed. 807 (1927).
2 2 Janvrin, Petitioner, 174 Mass. 514, 55 N. E. 381 (1899) (opinion b3
Holmes, C. J., who as Justice cites it in 273 U. S. 625.
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Avon rule, generally considered a conservative rule. A moral philosopher might point out a generalization on the subject of liberalism an4 conservatism to be drawn from this anomaly; it is perhaps
sufficient here to note it as an example of a result affected by the
point of view of the court reaching it, as well as by the point of
departure of that court. The West Virginia court may have
failed to see the forest for the trees, or it may be that the result
reached by it is more truly consistent with3 its general legal
philosophy than the Ben Avon rule would be.5
As the end of this study is approached, it may be said by way
of conclusion that it is felt that the chief purpose served by it has
has been to give a general, if not a comprehensive, picture of the
workings of a typical administrative body. No strildng peculiarities
of law or of practice have been noted. The most extraordinary rule
noted, that as to judicial review of fact findings, may be classified as constitutional, rather than administrative, law, although
the general practice is to consider problems of procedure, notice
and hearing, review of administrative action, and commission
finality, as the purest. administrative law. These questions, in so
far as they deal with constitutional requirements of certain practices, rather than with the practices themselves are classifiable as
constitutional law. The purely legal questions as to the extent of a
public service commission's jurisdiction, and as to rate regulation
and other controls exercisable over utilities, may be termed parts
of public utility law. So it seems that if labels are carefully
chosen, the field of administrative law will be narrowed to a
few questions of political science, as to governmental and commission practices in administrative regulation. If the labels are
chosen a little differently, all legal matters affecting primarily
the functioning of an administrative agency are included in administrative law. To avoid the necessity of choosing the label which
will make the boundaries of administrative law and those of this
work identical, it is perhaps better to hurdle the difficulty and call
this work, including matters of administrative practice, the agency's
statutory authority, and legal rules affecting its operation, an administrative study-not quite coinciding with the accepted administrative law concept.
253 See, for a quo vadis study of the subject, Guthrie, Pucblic &rvSm Comanissions (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 358.
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